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Abstract: Europe is experiencing rapidly accelerating poverty and social exclusion, 
following half a decade of financial crisis and austerity politics.  The key problem behind 
Europe’s malaise, in our view, is the economic disenfranchisement of large parts of its 
population in the winner-takes-all-society. This paper proposes that we examine the 
contribution of republican political theory as a distinctive approach that provides us with 
the conceptual and normative resources to reclaim what we call the political economy of 
democracy, the constellation of political and economic institutions aimed at promoting 
broad economic sovereignty and individuals’ capacities to govern their own lives. In this 
paper we identify three key ideas that together constitute a distinctively republican 
approach to political economy: establish an economic floor, impose an economic ceiling to 
counter excess economic inequality, and democratize the governance and regulation of the 
main economic institutions. 
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Europe is in turmoil. A little more than half a decade of global financial crisis and a 
deep economic slump has seen large swaths of European citizens facing dire economic 
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uncertainty and social exclusion. Austerity politics, an unimaginative knee-jerk 
response, continues to push already disadvantaged citizens across Europe into 
precariousness of a sort not seen since the 1930s. The brunt of the crisis is largely borne 
by those who are already struggling, with those at the top (the much maligned One 
Percenters) facing little or no adverse effects (Duménil and Lévy, 2013; Sayer, 2014). 
The resulting dramatic rise in inequality of economic opportunities, income and wealth 
is deeply problematic, morally and politically.  
 Proposals to keep economic precariousness and inequality in check, let alone 
reverse it (e.g., Piketty, 2014), rapidly find themselves gridlocked by a political and 
economic elite that has committed itself to riding out austerity policies at all cost for 
ideological rather than persuasive economic reasons (Stiglitz, 2010; Krugman, 2013).i 
The key problem behind Europe’s malaise, in our view, is the economic 
disenfranchisement of large parts of its population in the winner-takes-all-society 
(Hacker and Pierson, 2010).ii Against this backdrop, this paper proposes that we 
examine the contribution of republican political theory as a distinctive approach that 
provides us with the conceptual and normative resources to reclaim what we call the 
political economy of democracy, the constellation of political and economic institutions 
aimed at promoting broad economic sovereignty and individuals’ capacities to govern 
their own lives (Malleson, 2014). 
 In the wake of Liberalism’s complicity in bringing about the disastrous state of 
affairs we find ourselves in and Socialism’s apparent failure to offer a persuasive 
alternative, political theorists have started to find inspiration with the earlier tradition of 
political thought associated with classical thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Cicero, 
Machiavelli, Harrington, Rousseau, Paine, Robespierre, Jefferson, Madison, 
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Wollstonecraft, and so on. This “republican turn” (White 2011) is explored today in the 
writings of, amongst others, Philip Pettit, Michael Sandel, Quentin Skinner, Richard 
Dagger, Frank Lovett, Stuart White, Antoni Domènech, Alex Gourevitch, Eric 
MacGilvray and John McCormick. The attraction of republicanism lies precisely in its 
insistence that the core value of being a free person – understood in Pettit’s terms as 
being free from alien control or domination – entails the constitution of collective self-
determination. Republicanism is simultaneously a theory of freedom and politics (Pettit, 
1997), or put differently an account of freedom through politics.iii This makes it an 
appealing starting point for examining the economic conditions of democratic 
governance. 
 The aim of our paper is to build on the work of the republican political theorists 
mentioned above by reconsidering the foundations of economic independence as a 
condition for freedom from domination and economic sovereignty. We begin in the next 
section to briefly outline the political theory of republicanism, as we understand it. 
Republicanism of course contains a variety of different ideas, and not all claims are 
endorsed by all who self-identify as republicans. Nevertheless, we hope our outline will 
sufficiently appeal to those who share our republican intuitions and concerns to form a 
basis upon which to build the next sections. The bulk of the paper examines three key 
ideas that together constitute the republican political economy of democracy. First, 
republican political economy must secure a universal and unconditional economic floor. 
Second, republican political economy must ensure that unequal economic opportunities 
or power does not impede a person’s freedom from domination, by imposing an 
economic ceiling. Third, while economic floors and ceilings are important, 
republicanism nevertheless insists that economic sovereignty also be guaranteed in a 
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more direct manner, by establishing robust democratic control over the economy. These 
three dimensions of economic governance each have spurred a considerable literature. 
The main contribution of our paper is to bring them together (albeit summarily) and to 
reclaim them as the foundation of a distinctively republican approach to political 
economy. 
 
Republicanism as political economy 
 
What is republican political economy? The starting point – as always – is the distinctive 
idea of freedom that informs republican political thought.iv Republicanism adopts a 
notion of freedom that is distinct from the (more familiar) liberal ideal of freedom from 
interference (Pettit, 1997, 2001, 2012). Republican freedom requires not merely the 
absence of interference, but also protection against the mere possibility of interference. 
Liberal freedom says a person is only unfree when actually interfered with, but 
republicans entertain a more demanding view: a person who is placed in a position 
whereby a third party (individual or group) can impose their will on her is not 
considered free, even if that person refrains from actually interfering. Republican 
freedom requires that a person at all times is able to prevent or counter any attempt at 
undue interference, not merely its contingent absence. Republicanism and Liberalism 
also part ways in relation to what counts as interference. Liberals insist every form of 
interference is an infringement of freedom, whereas republicans believe that many 
forms of interference are in fact positively sanctioned by the person interfered with. 
Interference that is appropriately sanctioned by the individual or group that is subject to 
it cannot count as a constraint on freedom. Instead, republicans are only concerned with 
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arbitrary interference which does not track the avowed or readily avowable interests of 
the person(s) interfered with. They are concerned with what Pettit (2001, 2012) calls 
alien control. 
 Republicanism doesn’t merely give us an idea of what freedom is really about, 
but also an account of how to ensure that a free society – a society in which its citizens 
are all as equally free as possible – comes about. The republican conception of freedom 
as non-domination requires robust institutions that secure that all citizens are free from 
domination, both horizontal domination by others (dominium) and vertical state 
domination (imperium). Republican institutions come in three main forms. First, there is 
the legal regulation of rights (including property rights) as encompassed by the rule of 
law. Second, there is the constellation of economic resources (assets) that provide each 
citizen with a form of bargaining power to negotiate economic life on free and equal 
terms. Third, there is the set of political institutions that provide the opportunity of 
citizens to individually and collectively shape the institutional forms of social and 
economic life. 
 Recent republican thinking has been mostly devoted to exploring the rule of law, 
and its role in determining when interference counts as arbitrary (Pettit, 2009a; Lovett, 
2014, List, 2006), or political mechanisms as a means for protecting citizens against 
arbitrary interference (Pettit, 2009b, 2010, 2012). Important as legal and political 
institutions are, republican political economy must extend its efforts farther to 
theorizing how politics and the law interacts with the economic sphere. This view has 
considerable pedigree in the history of political thought (Gargarella, 2012).  
 
Almost all the great theorists of citizenship [...] have believed that in order to be a 
citizen of a polis, in order to be able to participate fully in public life, one needed to 
6 
 
 
6 
be in a certain socio-economic position.[…] People, it was said, could not act as 
citizens at all, or could not be expected to act well in the political sphere and to 
make adequate decisions, unless some attention was paid to matters of their wealth, 
their well-being and their social and economic status. (King and Waldron, 1988: 
425-426) 
 
The intricate interaction between economic and political institutions as a set of 
preconditions for republican freedom is what we refer to when we talk about republican 
political economy. 
 Historically and sociologically, the crucial institutional condition for the 
emergence of anything like republican freedom was property (Casassas, 2013; 
Domènech and Raventós, 2007). Property can be understood as durable control over a 
set of material resources or assets that leverages one’s freedom in economic exchanges 
by effectively securing a form of bargaining power vis-à-vis other agents. In other 
words, property allows one the freedom to chose who to contract with and under what 
conditions. In extreme cases, it offers an exit option from those exchanges that are 
deemed alienating, exploitative or otherwise detrimental to one’s freedom (Hirschman, 
1970), ideally by opening the door to more congenial ones.v 
 Of course the republican social ontology denies the existence of “free” markets 
of the sort stipulated by neoliberal ideology (Anderson, 2014). Instead, republicans 
adopt the classical political economy approach, as advocated most famously by Karl 
Polanyi (1944), by which economic exchanges are necessarily embedded in an 
institutional context (Wagner, 2005). Republican freedom is not about being 
independent from social and economic relations – republicans have little truck with 
libertarian atomistic individualism (Casassas and De Wispelaere, 2012) – but about 
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being equally free within such relations.vi Republicans also recognize that the 
differential ownership relations of a variety of economic assets entails a world marked 
by significant social division, typically one that divides itself along something akin to 
class lines. At the same time, the republican ideal of economic freedom should not be 
confused with promoting “warm” economic relations, an economy based on “dense 
social ties” or an “economy of proximity”. An overly romanticized reconstruction of 
republicanism along these lines (Dagger, 2006; Honohan, 2002; Sandel, 1996) detracts 
from the core concern with freedom from domination. 
 What counts as property in relation to securing economic freedom changes as 
society itself evolves. In the era of Classical Republicanism – extending from Ancient 
Greece and Rome to the America of Thomas Jefferson – socioeconomic independence 
was ensured by ownership of land, slaves, or livestock. In Commercial Republicanism – 
associated with the Scottish Enlightenment but equally well capturing other forms of 
Atlantic or Italian Republicanism – the importance of real estate gives way to ownership 
of and control over installations and facilities (Marx’ “means of production”), but also 
increasingly professional dexterities (human capital), opportunities to access  profitable 
markets, and so on (Casassas, 2010, 2013). Moreover, we can trace a direct historical 
line between the 19th century socialist emancipatory project and the political programs 
of 18th century Scottish Enlightenment and 17th century English Revolutionaries, with 
the Levellers and the Diggers at the left of the movement and, in its centre, moderate yet 
prominent figures like Harrington (Bernstein, 1963; Meek, 1954, 1977). Harrington 
aptly expresses the core of republican thought: “the man that cannot live upon his own 
must be a servant; but [he] that can live upon his own may be a freeman” (Harrington, 
1992: 269). Two centuries later Marx, in his Critique of the Gotha Programme, equally 
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powerful wrote that “the man who possesses no other property than his labor power 
must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made 
themselves the owners of the material conditions of labor. He can only work with their 
permission, hence live only with their permission” (Marx, 2008: 18). The socialist 
tradition can thus be seen as the modern heir of republican political thought (Domènech, 
2004). 
 Philip Pettit’s insistence that a free society must protect individuals from living a 
life under alien control is the latest installment of the same political doctrine. 
 
Enjoying social freedom (having a status that guards you against arbitrary 
interference) means being proof or at least being relatively proof against [arbitrary] 
interference. No matter what your preferences are, and no matter what the feelings 
of others happen to be, your social standing will still serve you well. It will provide 
a protective field that makes you resistant to the arbitrary incursions of others. It 
will ensure that, intuitively, you are in control of what you choose. (Pettit, 2006: 
136) 
 
In sum, republican political economy requires both the descriptive study of the many 
variegated power inequalities in economic and social life, and their impact on individual 
freedom from domination. It also requires a normative analysis of the political measures 
that positively affect republican freedom by reducing economic dependence. 
Republicans aim to reclaim the classical political economy approach from Adam Smith 
to Karl Marx (Casassas, 2010, 2013). In the remainder of this paper we outline three 
practical components of a republican political economy: establishing an economic floor, 
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imposing an economic ceiling, and universalizing democratic control in economic 
institutions. 
 
Establishing an economic floor 
 
The notion that republican freedom centrally depends on ensuring a measure of 
economic independence for all agents leads fairly straightforward to the requirement 
that we ought to establish an economic floor below which no one ought to fall. Such a 
floor serves a key purpose in equalizing power relations within economic exchanges, 
including guaranteeing the exit option that allows individuals to refuse any exchange 
they believe to be incompatible with their status as a free and equal citizen (Widerquist, 
2013). But the idea of an economic floor is more complex than our intuition suggests, as 
we show in this section. 
 The first consideration we need to address concerns the form such a floor should 
take: what types of resources are suitable for achieving the task at hand? In principle, 
many economic resources could qualify. In South Africa, for instance, land restitution – 
and (pre)distribution – has played a key role in promoting some measure of economic 
security (James, 2007; Walker, 2008). Many believe access to in-kind services or goods 
such as universal health care, free education or subsidized housing play a similar role. 
In his analysis of 19th Century “labour republicans”, Gourevitch (2011) relates how 
Thomas Skidmore claimed that the most suitable way to guarantee personal 
independence was a system of universal capital grants conferring upon all individuals 
reaching adulthood a one-off capital grant of their own financed from a tax on wealth. 
This represents one of the first formulations of basic capital schemes, prominently 
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discussed at the turn of the 20th Century (Ackerman and Alstott, 1999; Dowding, De 
Wispelaere and White, 2003). But the most familiar idea is no doubt the proposal to 
give each citizen a monthly basic income, independent of means test or work 
requirement (Van Parijs, 1995). The basic income proposal serves as a perfect example 
to illustrate the main features of an economic floor in the remainder of this section.  
 At what level should a basic income be pitched for it to promote republican 
freedom? The literature divides into two camps: those that advocate a basic income at 
subsistence level and those who believe even a basic income pitched significantly below 
subsistence (partial basic income) promotes important social goals.vii For republicans 
the level of basic income depends on what is needed to have a real impact on one’s 
economic bargaining power. An economic floor cannot be of such a low level that it 
could only contribute in a trivial manner to citizens’ freedom as non-domination: 
republican freedom requires a substantial economic floor. At least three considerations 
come into play here 
 First, the republican idea of an economic floor is neither a linear concept, where 
each monetary unit translates in a corresponding unit of freedom, nor is it a rigid 
baseline separating those “below” from those “at or above” economic independence. 
The reason is that we can imagine different levels across economic spheres at which one 
has reached a critical threshold value of economic independence which then translates 
in increased republican freedom. The economic floor should be conceived as a step 
good that contributes to republican freedom in a discontinuous manner. A gradual 
increase in the economic floor – a low basic income, for instance – may have little or no 
direct effect on a person’s republican freedom until it reaches a tipping point, at which 
point a “higher stage” of republican freedom comes about. An economic floor pitched 
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below such a tipping point or threshold entails that citizens are perhaps better off in 
terms of well-being, but not necessarily more free in the republican sense. 
 Second, the satisfaction of basic material needs constitutes a rather obvious 
tipping point, as it would make it possible (or more likely) for citizens to exit social 
relations that render them unfree. But this may be too demanding a requirement, for it is 
not clear whether republicans would have to insist on the “freedom to say no” to any 
and all economic exchanges (as implied, for instance, by Widerquist, 2013). Such a 
highly demanding conception of freedom will command precious little support in the 
real world. On the republican view, a substantial measure of economic independence 
must not necessarily entail the option to exit the labour market altogether.viii On the 
contrary, broadening the range of economic options such that citizens are no longer 
trapped in a particular job but instead have access to a sufficient range of feasible 
options to move between jobs could be fully compatible with the demands of republican 
freedom. Even a partial basic income may allow someone to exit a particularly 
demeaning job to take up a lesser paid or even part-time position that is more fulfilling, 
and for that reason preferred. In short, the level of the economic floor required by 
republican political economy varies in line with the alternatives society makes 
available.ix 
 Third, there are many reasons to think that an economic floor really only 
promotes republican freedom in conjunction with a wider set of public policies (a 
“package of measures”), including in-kind benefits such as access to health care and 
education, housing policies, care policies, regulations pertaining to pension provision, 
employment directives like a decent minimum wage, and so on. To use a phrase inspired 
by the debate on the Rawlsian basic liberties, we can distinguish between the “economic 
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floor” and the “worth of the economic floor”. The former is determined by the mere size 
of the basic income, but the latter is determined by the broader policy context in which 
the dividend operates. Obviously, an economic floor within a comprehensive protective 
policy context enhances republican freedom more than an institutional framework 
where an economic floor – even a high basic income – constitutes the sole mechanism 
conferring the weak a safety net. For this reason republicans must denounce Charles 
Murray’s (2006) proposal to replace all welfare state programs with a single basic 
income scheme. Having to buy all kind of social services in the market – where, for 
instance, prices of health insurances grow with risk because of “adverse selection” and 
risks themselves are no longer properly pooled – might rapidly turn the economic floor 
into an irrelevant measure for promoting republican freedom. 
 These three considerations demonstrate that determining the precise level of the 
economic floor, consistent with republican concerns for freedom from domination, is a 
complicated matter. There exists considerable scope for political debate in this regard, 
and this is to be welcomed. However, whatever the level, for the economic floor to play 
its part in securing republican freedom it must be unconditionally granted to each 
citizen. To impose conditions means accepting that at least some citizens may end up 
with a standard of living that threatens their republican freedom. Poverty and economic 
insecurity are readily acknowledged to impede one’s freedom: dire need is the main 
reason why individuals sign up to “free exchanges” that are exploitative or oppressive 
and often leave them barely better off than before.x But the very policies aimed at 
redressing poverty may become vehicles of arbitrary interference as soon as they 
impose conditions on those seeking them (Standing and Jhabvala, 2010). Whereas 
poverty makes a person vulnerable to dominium, conditional support puts her at risk of 
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imperium. The only remedy is to make the economic floor unconditional. The basic 
income proposal in its purest form represents the best example of how to institute an 
economic floor: it requires no proof of income or assets, no requirement of work or 
even willingness to work, no explanation of living arrangement, and no control of how 
the money is spent. 
 Let us now turn to a final key feature of the economic floor in republican 
political economy. Building on Richard Titmuss’ classic analysis, the programs of the 
modern welfare state typically take the form of ex post facto remedies. The main 
purpose of residual support, after all, is to address social problems associated with 
unemployment, disability and ill health, poverty and economic insecurity after the fact. 
In recent years, however, much policy attention has begun to rethink the role of social 
support in preventing adverse events from occurring in the first place or, where this 
proves unavoidable, in mitigating their impact at an early stage (Sinfield, 2012; 
Diamond and Liddle, 2011). The republican idea of an economic floor takes a similar 
preemptive approach to empowering individuals to negotiate the vagaries of economic 
life. While ex ante prevention of social ills is warranted on both individual welfare and 
social efficiency grounds, the distinctive republican contribution here is couched in 
terms of securing the wherewithal for each person to live her life on her own terms – 
“without permission”, in the Marxian phrase mentioned earlier. 
The ex ante prevention or pre-distribution approach is not a novel idea. It echoes 
the idea of a property-owning democracy, as it was understood by Jefferson in late 18th 
Century and expounded in more recent days by James Meade (1964) and John Rawls 
(2001) (O’Neill and Williamson, 2012; White and Seth-Smith, 2014). The following 
passages by Meade and Rawls are extremely telling. 
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The essential feature of [a property-owning democracy] would be that work had 
become rather more a matter of personal choice. The unpleasant work that had to 
be done would have to be very highly paid to attract to it those whose tastes led 
them to wish to supplement considerably their incomes from property. At the other 
extreme, those who wished to devote themselves to quite uncommercial activities 
would be able to do so with a reduced standard of living, but without starving in a 
garret. (Meade, 1964: 40) 
 
To which Rawls adds: “[t]he idea is not simply to assist those who lose out through 
accident or misfortune (although this must be done), but instead to put all citizens in a 
position to manage their own affairs and take part in social cooperation on a footing of 
mutual respect under appropriately equal conditions” (Rawls, 2001: 139). Republicans 
push for unconditional ex-ante public policy measures on similar grounds: where ex-
post measures lock citizens into a socioeconomic status quo – namely, capitalist markets 
in one or other form – universal and unconditional ex-ante measures empowers them 
from the start to engage on mutually agreed terms in the productive sphere. 
 
Imposing an economic ceiling 
 
An economic floor is a key requirement for securing freedom from domination in a 
republican political economy, but it paints only part of the picture. As we already 
mentioned in the previous section, the value of an economic floor – its effective 
capability to robustly protect a citizen’s economic independence – in large part depends 
on the broader socio-economic context. Chiefly amongst those is the power differentials 
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associated with vast inequalities of income and wealth. In this section we argue that a 
concern with promoting citizens’ republican freedom requires imposing an economic 
ceiling, which we understand roughly as a limit imposed on the differential economic 
power that derives from accumulations of wealth. 
The rationale underlying this requirement is straightforward. Vast accumulations 
of economic power tend to go hand in hand with the capacity of some to turn economic 
life into an oligarchic game by creating barriers to market entry, by fixing prices in a 
predatory way, by controlling the use of strategic resources (including investment; 
White, 2011), by hampering autonomy and self-realization in the workplace, and so on. 
Economic empowerment through a basic income or similar floor of resources 
constitutes a significant achievement from a republican point of view, but it nevertheless 
falls short of realizing republican freedom when powerful actors retain the power to 
determine the rules of the game, which in turn entails the capacity to exercise significant 
economic control over others (McCormick, 2011). 
 The idea of an economic ceiling comes in two main types: a Rousseauian and a 
Rooseveltian variation. The first manner in which to impose a ceiling consists of 
directly limiting the range of economic inequality. Without having to endorse strict 
equality of resources, republicans are rightly concerned about a society in which, 
through a variety of inventive schemes, the share of per capita earnings of employers 
and top management dwarfs that of ordinary workers. According to Pizzigati (2009: 41) 
only a generation ago “CEO pay averaged 40 times worker take-home. The gap in 2007: 
344 times.” And there is no sign of this trend abating. Republicans share the 
Rousseauian view that there are moral grounds for insisting that earnings differentials 
should remain within a reasonable limit, proportional to the work that has been 
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performed. Excessive inequality leads to a fractured society in which trust and social 
solidarity are hard to sustain. Pettit is adamant that “the ideal of equal status freedom 
[…] puts significant constraints on how large material inequalities can be” (Pettit, 2012: 
298). 
 Raising minimum wages and limiting top salaries are two familiar policies that 
contribute to keeping economic inequality in check (Pizzigati, 2004, 2012), but an 
effective economic ceiling likely requires a wider range of interventionist policies. Peter 
Taylor-Gooby recommends “measures to curb incomes at the top end through reforms 
to remuneration systems and possibly maximum wage legislation” as key requirements 
to combat inequality (Taylor-Gooby, 2013: 40). Or consider James Meade’s model of a 
“partnership economy”, a comprehensive Rousseaunian program consisting of four 
elements: pay within the firm is determined by profit-sharing and revenue-sharing 
mechanisms; wealth is taxed as it passes onto the next generation (wealth tax); the 
community owns a large share of the nation’s productive assets; and the return on the 
community fund pays for a uniform grant to all citizens (Meade, 1989; White, 2012). 
Thomas Piketty’s (2014) well-known proposal for a global tax on wealth to prevent 
soaring inequality also addresses Rousseauian concerns, while Ingrid Robyens  (2015) 
has recently offered a philosophical defense of this approach, which she dubs 
“Limitarianism”. 
 Under current political conditions, however, measures that directly restrict 
economic inequality by imposing a limit on top earnings or profits may prove difficult 
to implement. The second Rooseveltian model includes measures that allow economic 
inequality to emerge, but impose a strong regulatory ceiling on how vast economic 
wealth can arbitrarily interfere in citizens’ lives. The United States has a long – albeit 
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lost – tradition of regulating powerful social and economic actors to prevent them from 
eroding the freedom of ordinary citizens. Regulations conceived during the progressive 
era strengthened the foundations of democracy by institutionally confining economic 
power (Beard and Beard, 1939; Pizzigati, 2012). In telling rhetoric, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt explicitly accused the so-called “economic monarchs” of imposing a “new 
industrial dictatorship” (Leuchtenburg, 1995: 125). Roosevelt regarded oligarchies that 
foster the concentration of economic and political power as natural enemies of 
democracy, and the true culprits of the Great Depression (Sunstein, 2004). This opened 
the door for Thurman Arnold’s resolute action, as the Head of the Justice Department’s 
Antitrust Division between 1938 and 1943, against powerful actors such as General 
Electrics or The Aluminium Company of America (Leuchtenburg, 2009). 
Excessive wealth and economic power provides both the resources and the 
motivation to exert disproportionate political influence (Winters and Page, 2009). The 
economically powerful exercise their influence through a variety of mechanisms: 
lobbying government officials; contributing to expensive political campaigns; 
influencing public opinion through television, print media, and increasingly online 
social media; and the constitutional imposition of rules “beyond the reach of simple 
majority control” all aimed at reifying economic power (Winters and Page, 2009: 743). 
Hacker and Pierson (2010) capture this point well. Rather than a game between equally 
endowed actors, they argue, actual politics should be seen as “organized combat” 
characterized by the systematic exercise of power and influence by business elites who 
favor winner-take-all outcomes. “On the one side, government profoundly influences 
the economy through an extensive range of policies that shape and reshape markets. On 
the other side, economic actors – especially when capable of sustained collective action 
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on behalf of shared material interests – have a massive and ongoing impact on how 
political authority is exercised” (Hacker and Pierson, 2010: 196). Rooseveltian public 
control over powerful economic actors offers a countermeasure to winner-take-all-
politics. 
Republicans will endorse whichever strategy – or combination of strategies – 
works best, although there are reasons to think that an ex-ante Rousseauian approach of 
preventing economic power by limiting income and wealth accumulation and inequality 
may be preferable over an ex-post attempt to restrict its negative consequences through 
Rooseveltian regulation. Through its insistence on imposing an economic ceiling, 
republican political economy finds itself very much in line with the classical political 
economy view that state intervention must put an end to the privileges of modern 
employers, who in many cases are nothing less than “rentiers” (Casassas, 2013). We can 
understand Smith, Ricardo and even Marx as furthering a political ideal within the 
realm of manufacture and commerce by which everyone must be remunerated according 
to their productive contribution – including reasonable returns to capital investment – 
but where rents of any type (land or capital) – the result of unproductive labour – are to 
be avoided (Milgate and Stimson, 1991). In a similar vein, Keynes (2007) suggested 
nothing less than the “euthanasia of rentiers”, for rentiers severely limit people's 
participation in the economic sphere and produce injustice and inefficiency by 
controlling entire markets and economies. They must be fiscally destroyed, Keynes 
writes in his General Theory. Adam Smith, for his part, had already argued that in a 
prosperous economy profits are always low: when economic inclusion and participation 
are high, prices tend to decrease; and those who have incentives to prevent this from 
happening must be politically controlled (Casassas, 2010, 2013). The failure to do 
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precisely that is a large part of the explanation for the speculative origins of the current 
crisis of Capitalism (Varoufakis, 2011; Engelen et al, 2012; Sayer, 2014). 
 
Democratizing economic governance 
 
We now move onto the last step in our outline of a republican political economy of 
democracy. The final requirement to secure republican freedom is to both broaden and 
deepen the scope of economic governance by increasing citizen participation in 
determining the rules shaping our economy. Economic governance is broadened when 
more citizens are actively participating in setting economic regulation and policy. 
Economic governance is deepened when more aspects of the decision-making process 
become available for citizen participation. 
 Democracy is central in republican political thought (Pettit, 2012). This follows 
from the requirement that in a modern society at all times intervention must remain 
under the control of those at risk of being interfered with (McCormick, 2011). Fama and 
Jensen’s (1983) classic study demonstrates that the concept of ownership entails both a 
“benefit” and a “control” dimension: those benefiting from owning a resource are not 
necessarily the same as those controlling it; nor is the value of “control” for an owner 
reducible to that of its “benefit”. Contemporary political thinking perhaps has focused 
too much on the benefit dimension and failed to fully grasp the importance of control 
for free agency; a failure republicans are keen to redress. 
  This is why Alex Gourevitch (2013) is correct in arguing that a mere focus on an 
economic floor (in the form of an unconditional basic income) can never be sufficient to 
guarantee full republican freedom. Exit options at best offer a partial answer to 
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structural domination (Hsieh, 2005; Gourevitch, 2013; also Lovett, 2012; Anderson, 
2014), as does relying on improving the competitiveness of markets (Taylor, 2013). 
Even if market competition alleviates republican domination, the existence of large 
firms and the incorporation of workers into a governance structure that precludes 
negotiation of the terms of contract produce a source of domination that is different 
from market freedom (Anderson, 2014). Consequently, if the goal of a republican 
political economy of democracy is the empowerment of citizens to exercise effective 
self-determination in the economic spheres of production, distribution, consumption, 
and even investment (White, 2011; Ott, 2014), market freedom needs to be 
complemented with increased democratic participation at all levels of economic 
organization. 
 The republican democratization project proceeds in two stages. In the first 
instance, republicans follow the lead of Marx in demanding “collective control over the 
means of production”, for without the capacity to co-determine the terms under which 
we engage with each other as social and economic agents republican freedom cannot 
but remain a mirage. Republicanism, then, represents “the hope that it is possible, at 
least under some circumstances, for a people to shape its own political destiny, that we 
need not embrace the tenets of economic determinism” (MacGilvray, 2011: 19). But 
republican political economy also “individualizes” the Marxian insight in important 
ways, for collective control always retains the threat of vertical domination (imperium) 
unless the collective itself is subject to democratic control – in fairness, Marx himself 
was very much aware of this threat. Economic governance republican-style does not 
merely address the problem of powerful economic interests of selective individuals or 
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corporations, but needs to find ways to radically democratize the participation of each 
single individual in the decision process. 
 In the economic sphere this leads us straight to the intricate debate on workplace 
democracy, which has recently seen a revival in the republican political theory (Hsieh, 
2005; Gourevitch, 2013; González-Ricoy, 2014; Anderson, 2014; more generally 
Schweickart, 2011). In brief, the case for republican workplace democracy hinges in the 
first instance on an assessment of the exit costs associated with leaving the labor market 
or even a particular job, which those focusing entirely on securing a basic income in 
order to facilitate exit often fail to appreciate (Widerquist, 2013). With exit being more 
difficult, next we must inevitably devote our attention to the many ways in which 
employment contracts typically entail domination, understood as a relation of arbitrary 
inference on the part of employers over employees. Examples include the one-sided 
direction of workers to certain tasks or limiting their performance;  scheduling and 
rescheduling of time and location; favoritism in allocating work, overtime, 
compensation and promotion; verbal and physical abuse in supervision; and so on 
(Hsieh, 2005; González-Ricoy, 2014). This type of domination is often taken to be part-
and-parcel of managerial privilege and a necessary condition for efficient management. 
Republicans disagree and insist that cooperative forms of management are both more 
efficient and conducive to protecting republican freedom within the firm. While the 
precise form of workplace democracy remains a topic of continued debate, a consensus 
emerges that rebalancing the negotiation of working conditions through robust 
economic participation of workers within the firm is a requirement for republican 
freedom in the economic sphere.xi 
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 At the level of political institutions, this democratic ideal requires much more 
than a Schumpeterian process of selecting elite rulers, and equally it must avoid the 
economistic model of the citizen as a mere consumer of political goods. The republican 
alternative seeks its inspiration in a combination of democratic deliberation and 
democratic contestation. The republican literature discusses a variety of institutional 
mechanisms aimed at broadening and deepening democratic control in concrete 
contexts.xii Some of these measures affect the “electoral dimension” and are primarily 
concerned with assuring adequate representation and accountable delegation (Pettit, 
2000, 2009b, 2010; Mansbridge, 2009). Other mechanisms operate in the “contestatory 
dimension”, proposing a range of non-electoral devices from courts and arbiters over 
independent audits to emancipatory social movements (Pettit, 2000, 2012; Niederberger 
and Schink, 2013). The recent surge in worldwide popular protest à la Occupy takes 
pride of place in a republican theory of contestation (Malleson, 2014). But contestation 
always requires political empowerment, and its success in democratizing economic 
governance in turn depends on citizens also being economically empowered, closing the 
virtuous circle of economic floor, economic ceiling and democratic governance. This 
last point also restates the key republican insight that economic governance is political 
throughout – “political economy”, in the classic sense of the term. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we offer a brief outline of the republican political economy of democracy. 
Republican freedom from domination or alien control requires institutions and policies 
that offer robust protection against both horizontal and vertical forms of domination. 
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Risk of domination in a modern society is strongly associated with socio-economic 
position: republican freedom requires a significant level of economic independence as a 
countermeasure against a capitalist economic sphere rife with domination. Republican 
political economy provides both a descriptive account of the many forms of domination 
in economic life, and a normative account of why and how to counteract them. In this 
paper we suggest that a republican political economy must simultaneously establish an 
economic floor, impose an economic ceiling to counter excess economic inequality, and 
democratize the governance and regulation of the main economic institutions. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i See especially the work by Fred Block and Margaret Somers on the “ideational embeddedness” of free-
market fundamentalism (Somers and Block, 2005; Block and Somers, 2014). 
ii In this paper we refrain from discussing one key dimension of the Euro Crisis, namely the extent to 
which the economic, fiscal and political regulatory framework of the European Union, and the fragile 
balance between Euro-central and Euro-petal forces prevents the constitution of a Europe-wide demos 
impossible. The social processes mediated through the political reality of the EU are important factors in 
explaining the failure of social movements to capture the “critical moment” presented by the Euro crisis 
(Eder, 2014; also Innerarity, 2014; Outhwaithe, 2014). 
iii Republicanism here also intersects with the broader civilization project revolving around individual and 
collective autonomy that Wagner (2012) has argued characterizes modernity. 
iv For a more ecumenical list of republican values, see White (2011). 
v Recent economic research has demonstrated a clear correlation between independence (in the labour 
market) and subjective wellbeing (Bentz and Frey, 2008). 
vi “[I]n case it were true that only economic independence guaranteed political independence, then it was 
necessary to ensure economic independence to all” (Gargarella, 2012: 241). 
vii In addition, there are those who remain deliberately agnostic about the level of the grant. Philippe Van 
Parijs (1995) famously proposes a basic income pitched at the highest sustainable level, which he 
acknowledges may even be equal to zero. However, from a republican perspective, too low a level of the 
highest sustainable economic floor may not be worth the effort in securing it, particularly if other 
measures are more likely to better promote the kind of socioeconomic independence that is so closely 
related to the progress of republican freedom (Casassas and De Wispelaere, 2012). 
viii This is in line with those basic income advocates who regard it as a key instrument in liberating 
citizens within (not necessarily from) the world of work (Van Parijs, 1995; Standing, 2011). 
ix One of the controversial aspects of introducing a basic income concerns the motivation to work. 
Industrial relations research casts doubt on the effectiveness of performance-pay schemes (Marsden, 
2010), suggesting alternative motivation strategies would be more efficient. The traditional economic 
model nevertheless continues to operate with the notion that alternative sources of income will inevitably 
reduce a individual’s willingness to work. 
x For instance, fear of exploitation is one of the reasons for continued resistance against instituting a 
market in organs, even in the face of a growing deficit of available organs for transplantation purposes 
(Satz, 2010). 
xi Survey research also shows that inclusive decision-making at work is what workers themselves value 
(Freeman and Rogers, 2006). 
xii Political institutions must satisfy Lincoln’s three demands: they should be “for the people”, “by the 
people”, and “of the people” (Pettit, 2012). 
